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Introduction
In many durable goods markets, sellers who have market power and intertemporal capacity constraints face strategic buyers who make purchases over time. There may be a single buyer, as in the case of a government that purchases military equipment or awards construction projects, such as for bridges, roads, or airports, and chooses among the o¤ers of a few large available suppliers.
Or, there may be a small number of large buyers, as with companies that order aircraft or large ships, where the supply could come only from a small number of large, specialized companies. 1 The capacity constraint may be due to the production technology: a construction company undertaking to build a highway today may not have su¢ ciently many engineers or machines available to compete for an additional large project tomorrow, given that the projects take a long time to complete; a similar constraint is faced by an aircraft builder that accepts an order for a large number of aircraft.
Or, the capacity constraint may simply correspond to the ‡ow of a resource that cannot exceed some level: thus, if a supplier receives a large order today, he will be constrained on what he can o¤er in the future. This e¤ect may be indirect, as when the resource is a necessary ingredient for a …nal product (often the case with pharmaceuticals). More generally, the above cases suggest a need to study dynamic oligopolistic price competition for durable goods with capacity constraints and strategic buyers.
In this paper, we show that the preservation of future competition provides an incentive for a strategic buyer to split early purchase orders. We also demonstrate that the option to split orders leaves a buyer worse o¤ in equilibrium. We illustrate these results with a simple dynamic model. Two incumbent sellers choose capacities and a large number of potential entrants choose their capacities after the incumbents. Capacity determines how much a …rm can produce over the entire game. Sellers then set …rst-period prices, and the buyer decides how many units of the durable good to purchase from each seller. In the second period, given the remaining capacity of each …rm, 1 In an empirical study of the defense market, Greer and Liao (1986, p. 1259) …nd that "the aerospace industry's capacity utilization rate, which measures propensity to compete, has a signi…cant impact on the variation of defense business pro…tability and on the cost of acquiring major weapon systems under dualsource competition". Ghemawat and McGahan (1998) show that order backlogs, that is, the inability of manufacturers to supply products at the time the buyers want them, is important in the U.S. large turbine generator industry and a¤ects …rms'strategic pricing decisions. Likewise, production may take signi…cant time intervals in several industries: e.g., for large cruise ships, it can take three years to build a single ship and an additional two years or more to produce another one of the same type. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) estimate a dynamic procurement auction game for highway construction in California -they …nd that, due to contractors'capacity constraints, previously won uncompleted contracts reduce the probability of winning further contracts. the sellers again set prices and the buyer makes a purchasing decision. Demand has a very simple structure. The buyer has value for three units in total, with the …rst two having a current and a future utility while the third only has utility in the second period. This is the simplest structure that allows for future demand and the possibility of order splitting in the …rst period.
Our main results are as follows. First, entry is always blockaded -the incumbent sellers choose capacities such that there is no pro…table entry. Second, given these capacity levels, a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium in prices fails to exist. This is due to a combination of two phenomena.
On the one hand, a buyer has an incentive to split his order in the …rst period if the prices are close, in order to keep strong competition in the second period. This in turn creates an incentive for sellers to raise their prices. On the other hand, if prices are too "high,"each seller has a unilateral incentive to lower his price, and sell all of his capacity. We solve for the mixed strategy equilibrium and show that it has two important properties. The buyer has a strict incentive to split the order with positive probability: when the realized equilibrium prices do not di¤er too much, the buyer chooses to buy in the …rst period from both the high price seller and the low price seller. Further, we show that the sellers make a positive economic rent above the pro…ts of serving the buyer's residual demand, if the other seller sold all of his units.
Three implications then follow from the existence of positive economic rents for the sellers.
First, the buyer would like to commit to make no purchases in the second period, so as to induce strong price competition in the …rst period. That is, the buyer is hurt when competition takes place over two periods rather than in one. This result implies that a buyer would prefer not to negotiate frequently with sellers, placing new orders as their needs arise over time but, instead, negotiate at one point in time a contract that covers all possible future needs. 2 Second, a buyer has the incentive to commit to myopic behavior. In other words, the buyer is hurt by his ability to behave strategically over the two periods and would bene…t from a commitment to buy always from the lowest priced …rm. 3 Finally, we note that the buyer has an incentive to vertically integrate with one of the suppliers.
Our study of competition with a strategic buyer and two sellers who face dynamic (intertemporal) capacity constraints is broadly related to two literatures. The …rst is the literature on capacityconstrained competition. Many of these papers identify the "nonexistence" of a price equilibrium (Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) , Osborne and Pitchik (1986) , Gehrig (1990) , and others). Several other papers have studied the choice of capacity in anticipation of oligopoly competition and the e¤ects of capacity constraints on collusion; see, for example, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) In this literature capacity constraints operate on a period-by-period basis. Dynamic capacity constraints, the focus of our paper, have received much less attention in the literature. Griesmer and Shubik (1963) and Dudey (1992) Bhaskar (2001) shows that, by acting strategically, a buyer can increase his net surplus when sellers are capacity constrained. In his model, however, there is a single buyer who has unit demand in each period for a perishable good, and so "order splitting" cannot be studied. 4 Dudey (2006) presents conditions such that a Bertrand outcome is consistent with capacities chosen by the sellers before the buyers arrive. In the above mentioned papers, demand is modeled as static and independent across periods. The key distinguishing feature of our work is that the buyer (and not just the sellers) are strategic and the evolution of capacities across periods depends on the actions of both sides of the market. Second, our work is related to the procurement literature where both buyers and sellers are strategic. Of particular relevance is the work that examines a buyer who in ‡uences the degree of competition among (potential) suppliers, as in the context of "split awards" and "dual-sourcing." Yao (1989 and 1992) consider models where a buyer can buy either from one seller or split his order and buy from two sellers, who have strictly convex cost functions. They …nd conditions under which a buyer will split his order and characterize seemingly collusive equilibria. He demonstrates that having multiple buyers increases the incentive to split their orders across sellers. A mechanism approach to dual-sourcing is o¤ered by Riordan and Sappington (1987) . We depart from this literature in two important directions. First, the intertemporal links are at the heart of our analysis: the key issue is how purchasing decisions today a¤ect the sellers'remaining capacities tomorrow. In contrast, the work mentioned above focuses on static issues and relies on cost asymmetries. Second, strategic purchases from competing sellers and a single buyer in a dynamic setting are also studied under "learning curve"e¤ects; see e.g. Cabral and Riordan (1994) and Lewis and Yildirim (2002) . In our case, by buying from one seller a buyer makes that seller less competitive in the following period. In the learning curve case, that e¤ect is reversed, due to unit cost decreases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is set up in Section 2. In section 3 we derive the equilibrium and discuss a number of implications. We conclude in Section 4. Proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
The model
The buyer and sellers interact over two periods. There are two incumbents and many potential entrants on the seller side of the market. The product is perfectly homogeneous and perfectly durable over the lifetime of the model. All players have a common discount factor :
The buyer values each of the …rst two units at V in each period that he has the unit and a third unit at V 3 in only period 2. Thus, for each of the …rst two units purchased in period 1, the buyer gets consumption value V in each period. We assume that V V 3 > 0. 5 At the start of the game the incumbent sellers simultaneously choose their capacities. The potential entrants observe the incumbents'capacity choices and then simultaneously choose whether to enter and their capacity choice if they enter. We assume that the cost of capacity for any seller is small, ", but positive; throughout the paper, all pro…t levels are gross of the capacity costs. The marginal cost of production is 0. The capacity choice is the maximum that the seller can produce 5 The maximum discounted gross value that a buyer could obtain over both periods is equal to 2V (1 + ) + V 3 . Our speci…cation is consistent with growing demand. Note that, in general, the …rst and second units could have di¤erent values (say V 1 V 2 ). Also, we could allow the demand of the third unit to be random. It is straightforward to introduce either of these cases in the model, with no qualitatitive change in the results, but at the cost of some additional notation. over the two periods. Thus, each seller has capacity at the beginning of the second period equal to initial capacity less the units sold in the …rst period. In each period, each of the sellers sets a per unit price for his available units of capacity. The buyer chooses how many units to purchase from each seller at the price speci…ed, as long as the seller has enough capacity. Provisionally, we assume that the capacity choice at the start of the game for each incumbent seller is equal to 2 and that entry is blockaded. Later, we demonstrate that when the third unit has signi…cant economic value, these are the equilibrium capacity choices. We assume that sellers commit to their prices one period at a time and that all information is common knowledge and symmetric. We solve for subgame perfect equilibria of the game.
Let us now discuss why we have adopted this modelling strategy. We analyze a dynamic bilateral oligopoly game, where all players are "large"and are therefore expected to have market power. In such cases, one wants the model to re ‡ect the possibility that each player can exercise some market power. By allowing the sellers to make price o¤ers and the buyer to choose how many units to accept from each seller, all players have market power in our model. It follows that quantities and prices evolve from the …rst period to the second jointly determined by the strategies adopted by the buyer and the sellers. If, instead, we allowed the buyer to make price o¤ers, then the buyer would have all the market power and the price would be zero. 6 In fact, anticipating such a scenario, sellers would not be willing to pay even an in…nitesimal entry cost and, thus, such a market would never open. There are further advantages of this modeling strategy. First, with sellers making o¤ers, our results are more easily comparable with other papers in the literature. Further, there may be agency (moral hazard) considerations that contribute to why in practice we typically see the sellers making o¤ers. 7 The interpretation of the timing of the game is immediate in case the sellers'supply comes from an existing stock (either units that have been produced at an earlier time, or some natural resource 7 In general we see the sellers making o¤ers, even with a single buyer, as when the Department of Defense (DOD) is purchasing weapon systems. The DOD may do this to solve possible agency problems between the agent running the procurement auction and the DOD. If an agent can propose o¤ers, it is much easier for sellers to bribe the agent to make high o¤ers than if sellers make o¤ers, which can be observed by the regulator. This is because the sellers can bribe the agent to make high o¤ers to each of them, but competition between the sellers would give each seller an incentive to submit a low bid to make all the sales and it would be quite di¢ cult for the agent to accept one o¤er that was much higher than another. Figure 1 : Timing that the …rm controls). One simple way to understand the timing in the case where production takes place in every period is illustrated in Figure 1 . The idea here is that actual production takes time. Thus, orders placed in period 1 are not completed before period two orders arrive. Since each seller has the capacity to work only on a limited number of units at a time, units ordered in period one restrict how many units could be ordered in period two. In such a case, since our interpretation involves delivery after the current period, the buyer's values speci…ed in the game should be understood as the present values for these future deliveries (and the interpretation of discounting should also be accordingly adjusted).
Equilibrium
We are constructing a subgame perfect equilibrium and, thus, we work backwards from period 2.
After …nding the period 2 subgame outcomes, we derive buyer demand and …nd the equilibrium pricing strategies for period 1. Next, we identify possible buyer actions to modify the competition and limit seller rents. Finally, we examine equilibrium capacity choices by sellers.
Second period
There are several cases to consider, depending on how many units the buyer purchased from each seller in period 1. Let B denote the remaining units of buyer demand, and let C i denote a seller with i units of remaining capacity. If the buyer purchased 3 units in period 1, the game is over as there is no remaining demand in period 2. The substantive subgame cases are:
Buyer purchased two units in period 1 . If the buyer bought a unit from each of the sellers in period 1, then the price in period 2 is 0 due to Bertrand competition; each of the C 1 sellers earns a pro…t of 0. If the buyer purchased 2 units from the same …rm, then the other …rm becomes a monopolist in period 2 and charges V 3 ; the period 2 equilibrium pro…t of the C 2 seller is V 3 and, of course, the C 0 seller earns 0.
Buyer purchased one unit in period 1 . In this case, the buyer has demand for B = 2 units, and
there is one C 2 seller and one C 1 seller. There is no pure strategy equilibrium in this case. There exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in which seller C 2 's pro…t is V 3 and seller
the support of the prices is from V 3 =2 to V 3 , and the price distributions are
2p for p < V 3 with a mass point of
Buyer purchased no units in period 1 . Each seller enters period 2 with 2 units of capacity, while the buyer has demand for 3 units. Again, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, each seller's pro…t is V 3 , the price support is from V 3 =2 to V 3 , and the distribution is F (p) = 2 and the buyer is willing to pay at least V 3 . Seller C H 's security pro…t puts a lower bound on the price o¤ered in period 2. Given seller C H can sell at most B units (that is, the total demand), he will never charge a price below V 3 (B C L )=B, since a lower price would lead to a payo¤ less than his security pro…t. Since seller C H would never charge a price below V 3 (B C L )=B; this level also puts a lower bound on the price seller C L would charge and, as that seller has C L units he could
. 8 Competition between the two sellers …xes their pro…ts at their respective security levels.
The second insight deals with the incentives for aggressive pricing. We …nd that the seller C H will price less aggressively than seller C L in period 2. Seller C H knows that he will make sales even if he is the highest price seller, while seller C L makes no sales if he is the highest price seller. So, seller C L always has an incentive to price more aggressively. More precisely, the F H price distribution …rst-order stochastically dominates F L . This general property has important implications for the quantities sold and the market shares over the entire game.
The equilibrium payo¤s in the second period subgames are summarized in Table 1 : Table 1 : Period 2 incremental payo¤s for (2; 2) capacity game
First period
We use Figure 2 to summarize the buyer's purchasing behavior in period 1. In response to any pair of prices, the buyer maximizes net surplus, including period 2 consequences, by choosing how many units to purchase from each seller. The four regions in Figure 2 correspond to the buyer's optimal choice. First, in the no purchase region, both prices are su¢ ciently high that the buyer optimally waits until period 2 for a payo¤ of [2V + V 3 2V 3 ], from Table 1 .
as the discounted value of unit 3, this buyer payo¤ becomes 2 V . To see that this dominates buying 1 or 2 units in period 1, suppose that p 1 is the lower of the two prices. Employing Table 1 , we see that splitting has a buyer payo¤ of 2V (1 + ) + p 1 p 2 , and the comparison reduces to 2(V + ) < p 1 +p 2 , which corresponds to the line segment between the no purchase and split regions.
Similarly, waiting dominates buying 2 units from the lower price seller when the low price is above V + =2, represented by the vertical (and horizontal) line segments dividing the no purchase and 8 Note that while C
V3(B C) B
is not strictly speaking the "security" pro…t of the low-capacity seller, it becomes that after one round of elimination of strictly dominated strategies. More generally, for demand values V 1 V 2 ::: V B , seller C H has the monopoly option on the residual demand curve and the security pro…t level is maxfV B (B C L ); V B 1 (B C L 1); :::; V B C L +1 (1)g. This distinction does not matter for subgames of the initial (2; 2) capacity con…guration but it does arise for other con…guration cases; see the Appendix for details on these other cases. monopoly regions. Thus, whenever p 1 is to the left of the line segment, the buyer will purchase 2 units, and the comparison is then between monopoly for seller 1 and splitting. The buyer will prefer to split whenever the price di¤erence is less than , the buyer's savings from Bertrand competition following a split. Finally, note that indi¤erence holds for prices on the boundary lines. 9 There is no pure strategy equilibrium in period 1 with this demand structure, a common feature of games with capacity constraints. There is clearly no pure strategy equilibrium with no buyer purchases in period 1. Such a demand outcome requires high prices and either seller can pro…tably undercut and sell 2 units. For example, even at p 1 = p 2 = V + , the lowest prices where the buyer would choose to make no purchase, a price cut to anyp < V will induce the buyer to purchase 2 units from the deviating seller and, withp close to V , this will increase his payo¤ from to 2p.
As the demand structure in Figure 2 illustrates, it is easy to rule out candidate equilibria where the buyer only purchases 1 unit. The substantive case is where the buyer purchases 2 units. The buyer's incentive is to split when prices are within of each other. But, if prices are within of each other then each seller is able to raise his price slightly and still sell a unit. Thus, prices 9 Purchasing more than 2 units is dominated. If both prices are positive, buying 2 units via a split strictly dominates buying 3, since the ensuing Bertrand competition yields a price of 0 for the 3rd unit in period 2. When p i = 0 and p j > , purchasing 2 units from i is optimal and strictly dominates purchasing 3 units. If 0 p j , splitting and buying 3 units are both optimal choices. Of course, buying 3 units always dominates buying more than 3 units since there is no value for a fourth unit. Finally, on the monopoly-no purchase boundary, the buyer is also indi¤erent between buying 1 unit. In all other cases, buying 1 unit is not optimal. must be at least apart. If the gap is greater than , then the buyer will buy both units from the low price seller. In this case, however, the low price seller can raise his price and still sell two units. The only remaining possibility is a price di¤erence equal to . The buyer will either buy two units from the low price seller, split his order, or mix between the two options. No matter how the buyer's indi¤erence is resolved, there is always a pro…table deviation for at least one seller. Thus, Lemma 1. There is no pure strategy equilibrium in the monopsony model. Now, we present our results on equilibrium for period 1. Proposition 1. There exists a mixed strategy equilibrium for period 1 in which the outcome is e¢ cient: the buyer purchases 2 units with probability 1. The distribution of prices is symmetric and given by
iii) Equilibrium payo¤s are = p + for each seller and 2V (1 + ) 2p for the buyer.
Several fundamental economic properties hold in the equilibrium across the full parameter range for , the value for the third unit. First, the equilibrium is e¢ cient because 2 units are purchased for any realized prices. Since p V + , it must be that p 1 + p 2 does not exceed the threshold of 2(V + ) for purchasing 2 units. Second, the expected seller payo¤ is always p + . This is an important property of the equilibrium incentive structure. By charging p + , the seller is guaranteed a sale of exactly one unit. By construction, no price will undercut by more than , and there is no chance of not making a sale. At the same time, the rival seller never charges more than p + , so there is no chance of a monopoly outcome at p + . This is re ‡ected by the spread of the price support, p p, which never exceeds 2 . Thus, with a sale guaranteed, pro…t is at least p + . Can pro…t be any larger? If so, then the price distribution is ‡at within a neighborhood of p+ . As a result, the price p is strictly dominated, since there is no change in sales for a small price increase implying that the price distribution is also ‡at in a neighborhood of p, which contradicts the de…nition of p. Thus, seller pro…t is p + . The price distribution is then constructed so that every price has an expected payo¤ of p + .
Proposition 1 allows us to assess the impact of dynamic price competition on the buyer and seller sides of the market. The static price competition benchmark, where all purchases must occur in period 1, has the same price outcome as the period 2 subgame following no purchases in period 1. Thus, the outcome is e¢ cient, static expected pro…ts are , and the buyer expected surplus is 2V (1 + ) . Comparing this outcome to that for dynamic price competition, we see that the buyer su¤ers while the sellers gain. In the dynamic game, the outcome is e¢ cient and social surplus is unchanged from the static game. At p + , however, seller pro…ts are strictly higher in the dynamic game. By this measure, competition is less intense in the dynamic game. Intuitively, a buyer splits purchases in the dynamic game even though this increases current expenditures more than buying 2 units from the lowest priced seller. The value to the buyer is the preservation of competition for period 2. The less intense price competition in the dynamic game is associated not only with higher pro…ts, but also with non-overlapping price supports as p in the dynamic game is strictly above , the upper limit of the price support in the static game. With an e¢ cient outcome, but higher seller pro…ts, the expected net surplus of the buyer is necessarily lower in the dynamic game. Thus, Proposition 2. In equilibrium, the expected pro…t of each seller is greater than , the pro…t level in the static game. In an e¢ cient equilibrium, the buyer's expected payments in the dynamic game are greater those in the static game.
While the economic structure in terms of e¢ ciency, payo¤s relative to the support, and dynamic versus static comparisons do not vary with the value of the buyer units, and V , the quantitative dimensions of the equilibrium price distribution do. The required changes in the distribution commence when crosses a threshold relative to V . For below the threshold, no part of the equilibrium depends on V . The price spread (p p) is always 2 and equilibrium prices are strictly below the no purchase demand region (V + ). The distribution F is continuous and atomless, but it has a kink at p + . See Figure 3 for details. For above the threshold, the equilibrium distribution depends on V . Now, the price spread is less than 2 ; and the p is equal to V + . Furthermore, the price distribution rises smoothly at low prices, has a gap, then rises smoothly again, and then has an atom at p = V + . When is large, the form of the distribution for low creates a pro…table deviation to prices just below p. To maintain incentives, it is necessary to compress the price spread from 2 . But this implies that p is now below p + , and prices between these values are strictly dominated since demand is always in the split region for any price o¤ered by the other …rm (see Figure 4) . As a result, the distribution has a gap in this region. In turn, an atom is required at p in order for the highest price before the gap, p , to yield the equilibrium pro…t p + . Intuitively, the "missing mass" from the gap is redistributed as an atom at p so that low prices yield a su¢ ciently high probability of a monopoly outcome. 10 3.3 Possible actions by the buyer to reduce sellers'rents
As we saw above (Proposition 2), in the equilibrium each seller's pro…t exceeds : This is an important property and we now discuss some of its implications. We illustrate three strategies that the buyer can use to reduce his expected payments and still preserve e¢ ciency. First, the buyer bene…ts if he can commit to make all his purchases at once, e¤ectively collapsing the game into a one-shot interaction. Second, we show that the buyer has an incentive to commit to (myopic) period-by-period optimization. Third, we demonstrate that the buyer will bene…t by acquiring one of the sellers.
These three observations help to demonstrate the fundamental force underlying the equilibrium:
due to strategic considerations, the buyer does not always purchase from the lowest price seller when he plans to make further purchases, giving sellers the incentive to raise their prices above the static equilibrium level. As the buyer is "hurt"by acting strategically across the two periods of the game, we show that there are actions he can take (e.g. through some unilateral policy commitments) to e¤ectively change the game. In cases when such actions are possible, we thus identify reasons why the buyer would like to choose them. Our …rst observation is:
The buyer would bene…t from a commitment not to purchase any units in period 2.
The equilibrium seller pro…t level described in Proposition 2 is larger than in the static equi- 10 We have assumed 0 < < V . In the limit, as ! 0, the mixed strategy equilibrium converges to pure Bertrand competition for 2 units of demand (both prices are 0). As ! V , the distribution collapes to p = p = 2V . Furthermore, for above a threshold > , we are able to construct ine¢ cient equilibria, where the demand outcome is either a split or no purchase. Seller payo¤s are less than the pro…ts for the equilibrium in Proposition 1, but above the static benchmark; see Appendix for details. librium (when the buyer commits to buying all goods in period 1). Recall that the static outcome coincides with the period 2 equilibrium following no sales in period 1, where each seller earns V 3 and the buyer purchases 3 units. Viewed as a static game, this becomes an e¢ cient outcome (no discounting). Thus, both outcomes are e¢ cient but the static game has lower seller pro…ts and hence a larger residual of the social surplus remains for the buyer.
The behavior described in Corollary 1 would require, of course, some vehicle of commitment that would make future purchases not possible. This is an interesting result and can be viewed as consistent with the practice of airliners placing a large order that often involves the option to purchase some aircraft in the future at the same price for …rm orders placed now. Such behavior is sometimes attributed to economies of scale -our analysis shows that such behavior may emerge for reasons purely having to do with how sellers compete with one another. Our second observation is:
Corollary 2 The buyer would bene…t from a commitment to myopic behavior under which purchases are made on the basis of static optimization (in each period).
Suppose that the buyer could commit to myopic behavior. That is, for period 1 purchases, the buyer only values the current units (2 units, each valued at V (1 + )). Of course, period 2 purchase decisions are unchanged. As a result, a myopic buyer ignores the strategic link between the periods.
Further, in period 1 a myopic buyer will always purchases units from the lowest priced seller (as long as this price is below V (1 + )). There are two possible ways to generate a pure strategy equilibrium with a myopic buyer. First, in equilibrium each seller charges =2 in the …rst period and the buyer purchases two units from one seller. Then, the other seller charges a price of V 3 in the second period and the buyer purchases one unit. Thus, the buyer pays a total of 2 . To see that this is an equilibrium, …rst observe that the buyer indeed behaves optimally, on a period by period basis. Furthermore, neither seller has a pro…table deviation. In period 1, if a seller lowers his price below =2, he then sells both units but obtains a lower pro…t. If he raises his price, he sells no units in the …rst period but obtains a pro…t equal to V 3 in the second.
There is, however, the possibility that the buyer may split his order (given myopia, the buyer is indi¤erent between splitting or not) may be viewed as a weakness of the equilibrium described just above. This can be easily addressed in the second possible way to establish an equilibrium, if we introduce a smallest unit of account, . The equilibrium has one seller charging =2 and the other seller charging =2 in the …rst period and the buyer buying two units from the low price seller. The seller that made no sales in the …rst period, charges V 3 in the second period and the buyer purchases one unit from that seller. Thus, total payment in present value terms for the buyer is 2 2 . Clearly, the equilibrium payo¤s are essentially the same under both approaches.
The underlying intuition for Corollary 2 is that a seller knows that if he sets a higher price than his rival he cannot sell a unit in period one (and can only obtain a second period pro…t of V 3 ). The above comparison may provide a rationale for policies of large buyers that require purchasing in each situation strictly from the lowest price seller. In particular, a government may often assume the role of such a large buyer. It is often observed that, even when faced with scenarios like the one examined here, governments require that purchasing agents buy only from the low-price supplier, with no attention paid to the future implications of these purchasing decisions. While there may be other reasons for such a commitment policy (such as preventing corruption and bribes for government agents), our analysis suggests that by "tying its hands" and committing to purchase from the seller that sets the lowest current price, the government manages to obtain a lower purchasing cost across the entire purchasing horizon. We …nd, in other words, that delegation to a myopic purchasing agent is bene…cial: it intensi…es competition among sellers.
Suppose that a buyer can acquire a seller after he has chosen his capacity. A further implication of Proposition 2 is:
The buyer has a strict incentive to acquire one of the sellers, that is, to become vertically integrated.
This result is based on the following calculations. By vertically integrating, and paying the equilibrium pro…t of a seller when there is no integration, ; the total price that the buyer will pay is + since the other seller would charge the monopoly price V 3 for a third unit (sold in period 2). This total payment is strictly less than the total expected payment (2 ) that the buyer would otherwise make in equilibrium. Thus, even though the other seller will be a monopolist, the buyer's payments are lower, since the seller that has not participated in the vertical integration has lower pro…ts. 11 
Initial capacity choices by sellers
Thus far, we have conducted the analysis assuming exogenous capacity levels, where each seller has 2 units. Now, suppose that their capacity choices are endogenous and other …rms are free to enter.
We claim that when the discounted value of the third unit, , is signi…cant relative to the other units, then there is an equilibrium in which each …rm acquires 2 units of capacity. The endogenous capacity game is the following:
Incumbents simultaneously choose their capacities Entrants observe incumbent capacity choices and simultaneously choose their capacities
Firms that have positive capacity levels follow the timing as depicted in Figure 1 Assume that the cost of capacity is " per unit and focus on the limiting case of " ! 0. We then have the following proposition. In view of the positive pro…ts of incumbents, consider whether incumbent capacity expansion is pro…table. Recall that in a (2; 2) capacity setting, each …rm can guarantee in pro…ts because the other incumbent cannot supply the entire buyer demand. When the con…guration is (3; 2), this logic breaks down and the C 2 …rm is more aggressive in period 1. In equilibrium, the buyer will purchase 2 units from the C 3 seller in period 1 more often than in (2; 2). In particular, if the C 3
seller has a lower price than the C 2 seller in period 1, then the buyer will always buy 2 units from the lower priced seller: this preserves Bertrand competition in period 2 and there is no need for the buyer to split the order and pay a premium to include the higher price …rm in the split. This makes the C 2 seller price more aggressively and lowers the pro…ts of the C 3 seller. In the mixed strategy equilibrium for (3; 2), while the price supports intervals overlap, the price distribution of C 3 …rst order stochastically dominates that for C 2 : In equilibrium, the C 3 seller has a strictly lower payo¤ than a C 2 seller in (2; 2). Thus, capacity expansion is never pro…table.
With respect to a capacity reduction, from (2; 2) to (2; 1), the pro…t assessment is more subtle.
When the value of the third unit is signi…cant, V =2, then the capacity reduction leads to lower pro…ts for the C 1 …rm. On the other hand, as ! 0, the (2; 2) capacity equilibrium converges to pure Bertrand competition, while in (2; 1) both …rms make strictly positive pro…ts. The reason is that in the (2; 1) con…guration the C 2 seller will never price below V (1 + )=2, a lower bound that does not depend on the value of the third unit. This is a consequence of buyer demand in period 1: as long as C 2 sets a price below V (1 + ), the buyer will purchase at least one unit from C 2 . Depending on the price from C 1 , the C 2 seller might also sell a second unit in the …rst period but, since C 1 only has 1 unit of capacity, C 2 is guaranteed a pro…t of at least on its second unit.
Hence, C 2 can guarantee a payo¤ of at least V (1 + ) + and, with 2 units of capacity, will never price below 1=2 of V (1 + ) + : Given this, the C 1 seller can price at 1=2 of V (1 + ) + and be assured of a sale and hence a pro…t that remains positive even as ! 0. Thus, as a measure of competitive pressure, it is V rather than that matters in (2; 1) when the third unit is of vanishing value.
In contrast, it is rather than V that functions as the "marginal value" with respect to competitive pressure when the con…guration is (2; 2) when > V =2. From Proposition 1, the rate of pro…t growth in is greater than 1. As a result, the pro…t di¤erence between (2; 2) and (2; 1) for the C 1 seller rises with . As crosses , this di¤erence is su¢ ciently large that it dominates the security pro…t component of V (1 + )=2 for the C 1 seller in the (2; 1) con…guration.
Intuitively, additional capacity is valuable for the C 1 seller when the marginal value of the third unit is large. Thus, a (2; 2) con…guration is neiher susceptible to capacity deviations by incumbents nor attractive to entrants.
Conclusion
Capacity constraints play an important role in oligopolistic competition. In this paper, we have examined markets where both sellers and the buyer act strategically. Sellers have intertemporal capacity constraints, as well as the power to set prices. The buyer decides which sellers to buy from, taking into consideration that current purchasing decisions a¤ect the intensity of competition in the future. Capacity constraints imply that a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist. Instead, sellers play a mixed strategy with respect to their pricing, and the buyer may split the order.
Importantly, we …nd that the sellers enjoy higher pro…ts than they would have in an one-shot interaction (or, equivalently, the competitive pro…t from satisfying residual demand). The buyer is hurt, in equilibrium, by the ability to behave strategically over the two periods, since this behavior allows the sellers to increase their prices above their rival's and still sell their products. Thus, the buyer has a strict incentive to commit not to buy in the future, or to commit to myopic, period-byperiod maximization (perhaps by delegating purchasing decisions to agents), as well as to vertically integrate with one of the sellers. This is, to our knowledge, one of the …rst papers to consider capacity constraints and strategic buyer behavior in a dynamic setting. In an earlier working paper, Biglaiser and Vettas (2004) , examined the model when there were multiple buyers and allowed non-linear pricing. When there are multiple buyers and linear pricing, they found that the sellers were able to capture rents above the value of the marginal unit . The idea is that if each of N buyers purchased 2 units in period 1, and the sellers had equal remaining capacity (N of the original 2N units), then Bertrand competition would ensue in period 2. This outcome involves both implicit coordination by buyers in period 1 and aggregate order splitting. With non-linear pricing, they found in the monopsony case that the sellers' payo¤s were held to the value of the marginal unit ( ); interestingly, they found that the sellers still retain rents in the duopsony case.
With regard to future work, it would be interesting to consider the case where the products offered by the two sellers are di¤erentiated. Is there a distortion because buyers strategically purchase products di¤erent from their most preferred ones, with the purpose of intensifying competition in the future? Another direction to consider is an alternative price determination formulation. For instance, sellers may be able to make their prices dependent on the buyers' purchasing behavior e.g. by o¤ering a lower price to a buyer that has not purchased in the past: "loyalty discount"and other quantity based price discrimination mechanisms.
buyer purchases one unit (due to standard Bertrand analysis). Case (b): buyer purchased 1 unit.
The subgame is (B; C H ; C L ) = (2; 2; 1). Demand is more subtle than in case (a), since the buyer may purchase up to 2 units. Figure 5A shows the demand outcome for any pair of prices. We need to show that the price distributions speci…ed in the text form a mixed strategy equilibrium.
By construction, any price in the support yields a payo¤ of V 3 for seller C 2 and V 3 =2 for seller C 1 .
Consider seller C 2 . At any price p < V 3 =2, the buyer purchases 2 units from C 2 and the payo¤ is 2p which is less than V 3 . At any price p > V 3 , the buyer purchases 1 unit from seller C 1 . Thus, C 2 has a payo¤ of 0. Analogous arguments hold for seller C 1 . Thus, it is optimal for each seller to price according to the speci…ed distributions. Case (c): buyer made no purchases. The subgame is symmetric and (B; C H ; C L ) = (3; 2; 2). The buyer may now purchase up to 3 units and Figure 5B shows the demand outcome across prices. By construction, any price in the support yields a payo¤ of V 3 for each seller. If a seller o¤ers a price p < V 3 =2, then the buyer purchases 2 units from that seller and the payo¤ is 2p which is less than V 3 . At any price p > V 3 , the buyer purchases 2 units from the other seller, but no units at price p. Thus, the deviating seller has a payo¤ of 0. Thus, it is optimal for each seller to price according to the speci…ed distribution.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that we have an equilibrium at some (p L ; p H ).
Without loss of generality, we label prices so that p L p H and refer to payo¤s L and H for the L (low) and H (high) seller, respectively. First, observe that any price above V + 3 =2 leads to a payo¤ of . This is because, by demand in Figure 2 , there are no period 1 sales for this seller and, by Table 1 , the period 2 payo¤ is V 3 . This implies that any price below =2 is strictly dominated since, with a capacity of 2 units, the payo¤ at such a price is less than . Next, consider But then L can pro…tably deviate to a price p where < p < V + and be assured of selling at least 1 unit for a payo¤ greater than .
This leaves candidate equilibria where =2 p L V + . Referring to demand in Figure 2 , we see that (p L ; p H ) cannot be interior to any of the three demand regions (above the 45 line). Since any price p < p L implies 2 units for L and a payo¤ of 2p, it must be that the buyer chooses 2 units from L with probability 1 in response to (p L ; p H ) since any other buyer choice would leave L with a pro…table deviation. This implies that H = . But then H can pro…tably deviate to any price p where V + =2 < p < V + 3 =2 as this guarantees a sale of 1 unit and a payo¤ of at least V + =2 > . Thus, there is no equilibrium in this case.
The second case is the boundary between the Split and No Purchases,
Note that L can guarantee a monopoly outcome by deviating to any
on this boundary, we see from p L V + that the last inequality above is guaranteed by V > .
Thus, L has a pro…table deviation.
The last case is the Split and Monopoly boundary,
where the buyer is indi¤erent between the two choices. As in the …rst case, L can guarantee a sale of 2 units by o¤ering a lower price, although in this case any p < p L will su¢ ce. Since this yields a payo¤ of 2p, it must be that the buyer chooses Monopoly for L with probability one. This implies
But H can guarantee a sale of 1 unit by o¤ering any p < p L + . Thus the lower bound of =2 p L implies that H has a pro…table deviation and there is no equilibrium in this case.
Proof of Proposition 1. For the distributions speci…ed in the text, we need only verify that prices within the supports are optimal, while deviations to prices outside the supports are unpro…table. The undiscounted period 2 subgame payo¤s are in the text in Table 1 . From that table, we compare payo¤s across the feasible set of buyer period 1 choices and arrive at the demand pattern in Figure 2 in the text. We then construct the pro…t function by calculating demand at pairs of prices, and take expectations over the rival's price using the distribution speci…ed in the proposition. First, we examine the case when < . Calculating the pro…t function, we …nd that for p p
At prices above the equilibrium support, two cases arise depending on the buyer's demand
For each p, we substitute for the F term as dictated by the distribution speci…ed in the propo- Second, we examine the remaining case of > . Calculating the pro…t function, we …nd
As before, we substitute for the F distribution speci…ed in the proposition. Veri…cation of the equilibrium then involves a straightforward, but lengthy comparison of payo¤s.
Finally, the e¢ ciency property and payo¤ outcomes were demonstrated in the text.
Ine¢ cient equilibria for large in the (2; 2) capacity con…guration. For su¢ ciently large, there is a set of ine¢ cient equilibria. Suppose > 4V (3 2 p 2) u :69V . Then the following distribution F (p) = (p )=(2V + p) for p 2 p; p , where p = 2(V + ) p and p 2 (G( ); 2 ), where G( ) = (V =4) 2 =V + , is an equilibrium. The support is a square that is centered on the point (V + ; V + ) and always less than in width. Referring back to Figure 2 on demand, we see that the buyer either buys a unit from each seller or buys no units in period 1. Thus, the equilibrium is ine¢ cient. A seller's payo¤, p, is bounded above by 2 which, in turn, is at least p V less than a seller's payo¤ in the e¢ cient equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, we show that (2; 2) is not susceptible to entry. Consider a (2; 2; 1) con…guration. In any period 2 subgame every seller has a payo¤ of 0. This is because every pattern of period 2 demand purchases results in either an excluded seller or a seller with excess capacity, so that Bertrand logic applies in the subgames. This implies that every seller has a payo¤ of 0 in the overall game. Suppose 3 units are purchased in period 1. Since the buyer has the option of not buying a 3rd unit in period 1 and instead acquiring that unit next period for a price of 0, the buyer will not pay a positive price on each unit purchased. Thus, some seller o¤ers a price of 0 and makes a sale. If this is seller C 1 we are done. If it is one of the C 2 sellers, then the above argument (for a 3rd unit) holds and the buyer will never pay a positive price. Now suppose 2 units are purchased in period 1. Therefore, some seller has no sales in period 1 and has 0 payo¤ overall, since there are no pro…ts in period 2. But then no seller can make a sale at a positive price in period 1, since the excluded seller can pro…tably undercut. Suppose that one unit is purchased in period 1. With two excluded sellers, the previous undercutting argument applies. Finally, if no sales occur in period 1, then the absence of pro…ts in period 2 implies that all sellers have a payo¤ of 0 overall. Thus, given a (2; 2) con…guration, entry is never pro…table. Now, consider the capacity choices of incumbent sellers. We must show that it is not pro…table to add or to reduce capacity. Let i denote the equilibrium pro…t of seller C i when the capacity con…guration is (2; i).
It is su¢ cient to analyze the addition or subtraction of one unit of capacity (i = 1; 3). This is since i = 0 automatically has a payo¤ of 0 and as we note below, choices i 3 share a common equilibrium payo¤. We will show that 2 > 3 and 2 > 1 . First, we …nd 3
and compare and then we do the same with 1 .
Consider (3; 2) the buyer has two sellers to choose from and up to 3 units of demand in period 1, this generates 7 distinct subgames in period 2. Working through all the subgames, the equilibrium payo¤s are in Table 1 . All of these re ‡ect pure strategy equilibria except for (3; 3; 2) and (2; 3; 1) which are mixed.
See Figures 5C and 5D .
Moving to period 1, the buyer demand is determined by optimizing over how many units to purchase and from whom given period 2 payo¤s and price o¤ers p i and p j . See the demand pattern in Figure 6A .
The mixed strategy equilibrium for (3; 2) when where p 2 = V V + , p 2 = V , p 3 = , p 3 = 2 : Pro…t for the C 2 seller is p 3 and pro…t for the C 2 seller is p 2 + . We note that F 2 has an atom at p 2 and that F 3 has a ‡at region. As with the (2; 2) con…guration, veri…cation of this equilibrium (as well as the 3 subsequent equilibria) involves checking that prices outside of the supports are not pro…table relative to the equilibrium payo¤.
See Figure 6B .
The mixed strategy equilibrium for (3; 2) when < (3;2) is given by F 2 (p) = , p 3 = , and p 3 = 2 : Pro…t for the C 2 seller is p 3 and pro…t for the C 2 seller is p 2 + . See Figure 6C .
To verify that a C 2 seller has no incentive to add capacity, we compare pro…t in the (2; 2)
con…guration with the pro…t of a C 3 in the (3; 2) con…guration. It is immediate that < (3;2) .
This implies that there are 3 cases to consider when comparing pro…ts. The result then follows immediately by routine calculations. Now, consider the (2; 1) con…guration. The buyer has two sellers to choose from and up to 3 units of demand in period 2. Working through all the subgames, the equilibrium payo¤s are in Table 3 . Table 3 : Discounted Period 2 incremental payo¤s for (2; 1) capacity game Period 2 (B; H; L) con…guration Buyer Payo¤ Seller C H payo¤ Seller C L payo¤ (3; 2; 1) and V 3 V =2 V 2 (3; 2; 1) and V 3 < V =2 V =2 V V =2 (2; 1; 1) V (2; 2; 0) and V 3 V =2 V 2 0 (2; 2; 0) and V 3 < V =2 0 V 0 (1; 1; 0) 0 0
All of these re ‡ect pure strategy equilibria except for (3; 2; 1) when V 3 < V =2 which is mixed (see Figure 5E ).
Moving to period 1, the buyer demand is determined by optimizing over how many units to purchase and from whom given period 2 payo¤s and price o¤ers p i and p j . Demand can be seen in Figures 7A and 7B for each of the V 3 cases.
The mixed strategy equilibrium for (2; 1) when
V =2 is given by
for p p < p 1 for p = p where p = V 2 + , and p = V + : We note that there is an atom at p for F 2 . The pro…ts for the C 1 seller are p and for the C 2 seller they are 2p.
The mixed strategy equilibrium for (2; 1) when < (2;1) is given by , and p = V + : The pro…ts are p for the C 1 seller and 2p for the C 2 seller.
We observe that there are atoms at the top of both supports and that there is a gap in F 2 support below p. It is immediate that > (2;1) . This implies that there are 3 cases to consider when comparing pro…ts. The result then follows immediately by routine calculations whenever V =2.
See Figures 7A and 7B for the equilibrium supports.
There is no entry in a (2; 1) con…guration. If an entrant enters and installs a unit of capacity, then the following is an equilibrium in period 1. Each of the …rms who have a unit of capacity charge 0 and the …rm with 1 unit of capacity charges , with the buyer buying both units at a price of 0 and the seller with 2 units of capacity selling a unit in period 2 for V 3 . To see that this is an equilibrium, examine seller deviations. If one of the sellers who charges 0 in the putative equilibrium raises its price, then the buyer will buy 1 unit at a price of 0 and one unit at a price of . This gives the buyer a higher payo¤ than buying units from the seller who deviated, since there will be Bertrand competition between 2 sellers each trying to sell one unit in period 2. Thus, the deviating seller does not bene…t. If the seller with 2 units of capacity lowers its price the buyer will buy 1 unit from it and one from one of the sellers charging 0. Again, the price in period 2 will be 0 due to Bertrand competition. Thus, this seller lowers his payo¤ by lowering its price. Clearly, the seller cannot bene…t by raising its price above , since the buyer will still not buy from it in period 1. Thus, we have an equilibrium and entry is not possible. 
